2022 – Page 4 – Nautiliyaa Legal

6 Aug

If a Statute Prescribes a Method or Modality for Exercise of Power, by Necessary Implication, the Other Methods of Performance are Not Acceptable: SC

It is well recognized principle of law that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed.[1] The Hon’ble Supreme Court has once again affirmed the same. The principle and the verdict of the Apex Court[2] can be understood better in the light of the fact of the matter.

In view of the failure of a person, accused of dishonor of cheque and being prosecuted under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“1881 Act“), to deposit 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation in terms of Section 143(A) of the 1881 Act as per the orders passed by the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Nagamangala, the application preferred by the accused under Section 145(2) of the 1881 Act seeking permission to cross-examine the opposite party was found non-maintainable. The accused was not allowed to cross-examine the witness and was ultimately found guilty under section 138 of 1881 Act.

In subsequent appeals, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court was confirmed with the remarks that accused did not comply with the order of this Court to deposit 20% of cheque amount, hence, it disclosed that the accused was reluctant in complying with the order of the Court and thus the Magistrate had rightly refused the prayer made by accused seeking permission to cross-examine P.W.1 and proceeded to pass impugned order. On the challenge, the Hon’ble High Court also dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the accused affirming the view taken by the courts below.

On appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the question for consideration was precisely whether it is within the competence of the court to deprive an accused of his right to cross-examine a witness if the accused has failed to deposit the interim compensation. In other words, whether the court/authority deviate from the method in which that power has to be exercised by the court as expressly laid down in the statute? The Court examined the provision under section 143(A) of the 1881 Act which confers power to direct interim compensation. As per sub-section (5) of section 143(A), the interim compensation payable under the section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Thus, the remedy for failure to pay interim compensation as directed by the Court and the method to realize the same is provided for in the statute.

In this background, the Court applied the law settled by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor [AIR 1936 Privy Council 253 (2)] and relied upon by the Supreme Court in its decision in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and others [AIR 1964 SC 358] that “where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden”. The law was reiterated in J.N. Ganatra vs. Morvi Municipality [(1996) 9 SCC 495] and Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala [(2002) 1 SCC 633] where it was held that “It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself.” While applying the law to the facts of the case, the Court held that Section 143(A) nowhere contemplates that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be imposed with any other consequence including foreclosing the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant. As per law, the interim compensation can only be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therefore, any exercise of power by the Courts otherwise, goes beyond the permissible exercise of power given under the section. The Court accordingly ruled that the order of the lower court suffered from an inherent infirmity and illegality and was liable to be set aside.

[1] Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426

[2] Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha [Criminal Appeal No. 2872 of 2022]

1 Aug

The Power of Adjudicatory Authority under Section 7(5)(a) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is Discretionary

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy

The Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal admitted the application of Axis Bank under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Vidarbha Industries Power Limited, the Appellant who approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vidarbha Industries Power Limited v. Axis Bank [CIVILAPPEAL NO. 4633 OF 2021] after Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal, NCLAT refused to stay the proceedings initiated by Axis Bank (Respondent).

The Appellant is a Generating Company within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Electricity Act, 2003. Under the Act, the business of electricity generating companies is regulated and controlled by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission which determines the tariff chargeable by former. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) floated the tender where the Appellant was awarded the contract for implementation of a Group Power Project (GPP). The GPP was later converted into an Independent Power Project (IPP). The Appellant was subsequently permitted to expand the capacity of its power plant by adding a second unit of 300 MW as an IPP. By an order dated 20^th February 2013, the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC) approved a Power Procurement Agreement between the Appellant and Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) subject to No Objection Certificate (NOC) of MIDC. MIDC granted its NOC to the Power Project Agreement. On 21^st June 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) amended the New Coal Distribution Policy 2007. Accordingly, Ministry of Coal (MOC) issued an order directing Coal India Limited (CIL) to sign Fuel Supply Agreements (FSA) with Power Projects with an aggregate capacity of 78,000 MW. The Ministry of Power issued a list of Power Projects with an aggregate capacity of 78,000 MW that were eligible to execute FSAs with CIL. The Appellant was not included in the list.

When the MERC granted approval to RIL to procure power from the Appellant’s Unit, a consolidated Power Purchase Agreement was executed between the Appellant and RIL under which the Appellant agreed to supply and RIL agreed to purchase, power generated from both units of the Appellant’s Power Plant. The agreement was duly implemented by the parties. As a matter of routine in January 2016, the Appellant filed an application before the MERC for the purpose of truing up the three year Aggregate Revenue Requirement and for determination of tariff in terms of MERC (Multi Year Tariff) Regulation 2011, in view of, inter alia, the increase in fuel costs, consequential to the rise in the cost of procuring coal for the purpose of running the power plant. The MERC vide its final order disallowing a substantial portion of the actual fuel costs as claimed by the Appellant for the Financial Years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 and also capped the tariff for the Financial Years 2016-2017 to 2019-2020. The Appellant filed an appeal being before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL). The APTEL allowed the appeal and directed MERC to allow the Appellant the actual cost of coal purchased for Unit-1, capped to the fuel cost for Unit 2 in terms of the FSA that had been executed, till such time as a FSA was executed in respect of Unit 1.

As per the Appellant a sum of Rs.1,730 Crores was due to the Appellant in terms of the said order of APTEL. When the Appellant filed an application before the MERC for implementation of the directions contained in the APTEL order, MERC filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the order of APTEL. The Appeal has been pending. In view of the pending appeal of MERC in the Apex Court, the Appellant was unable to implement the directions of APTEL. The Appellant was therefore, for the time being, short of funds. According to the Appellant, implementation of the orders of the APTEL would enable the Appellant to clear all its outstanding liabilities.

Based on this ground of not being able to repay the loan on account of the pending appeal before the Supreme Court and the company being solvent otherwise, the Appellant had filed a Miscellaneous Application before the NCLT when Axis Bank filed a section 7 Application. The MA was rejected and so was the appeal before the NCLAT.

The Appellant approached the Supreme Court mainly contesting the impugned order delivered by NCLAT on the ground that Appellant had been unable to realize the sum of Rs.1,730 Crores and pay the dues of the Respondent, only because an appeal filed by MERC was pending in the Supreme Court. Essentially, the argument of Appellant was that it is in the current situation for no fault of its own, but due to the statutory authorities. MERC had prevented the Appellant from availing the benefit of favourable orders passed by APTEL. While interpreting the provisions of IBC, the Counsel of the Appellant further contended that Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC uses the expression ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ which has been used in section 9 of the IBC. The word ‘may’ enables NCLT to reject an application, even if there is existence of debt, for any reason that the NCLT may deem fit, for meeting the ends of justice and to achieve the overall objective of the IBC i.e. revival of the company and value maximization. Additionally, NCLT has been given inherent power under rule 11 of the NCLT Rules. Therefore, the Adjudicatory Authority has discretion to admit or not admit an application made under section 7 of the IBC. The given interpretation was strenuously opposed by Axis Bank.

After hearing the arguments on both sides, the Supreme Court observed that the Adjudicating Authority in this matter had found Section 7(5) (a) of the IBC to be mandatory. The NCLAT also indicated that no other extraneous matter should come in the way of expeditiously deciding a petition under Section 7 or under Section 9 of the IBC. The Apex Court, in principle, agreed to the findings of the NCLT and NCLAT. The Court went on to add that the viability and overall financial health of the Corporate Debtor, however, are not extraneous matters.

While applying the same to the facts of the case, Court held that an award of the APTEL in its favour, where a sum of Rs.1,730 crores (an amount far exceeding the claim of the Financial Creditor), is realisable by the Corporate Debtor, cannot be completely disregarded. The Court applied the rule of literal interpretation and agreed with the interpretation given by the Counsel for the Appellant that the word “may” in section 7(5)(a) confers discretion to admit or reject the application made by a financial creditor even if the dual conditions of debt and default are fulfilled. The Court in this regard referred to the judgments in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors [(2014) 2 SCC 1], B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal [(2011) 4 SCC 266 ] and Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1973) 1 SCC 216].

The Court then went on to underline the ‘noticeable differences’ between the procedure under section 7 and section 9 of the IBC. After deliberating on the provisions, the Court observed that “Significantly, Legislature has in its wisdom used the word ‘may’ in Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC in respect of an application for CIRP initiated by a financial creditor against a Corporate Debtor but has used the expression ‘shall’ in the otherwise almost identical provision of Section 9(5) of the IBC relating to the initiation of CIRP by an Operational Creditor” which persuaded the Courts to conclude that Legislature intended Section 9(5)(a) of the IBC to be mandatory and Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC to be discretionary. Therefore, while dealing with an application under section 7 of the IBC, the Adjudicatory Authority may examine the “expedience of initiation of CIRP, taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances, including the overall financial health and viability of the Corporate Debtor.”

While reiterating the difference laid down in Swiss Ribbons case between the financial and operational creditors, the Court observed that the Legislature has consciously differentiated the two. While the credits extended by financial creditors are often long term credits which are secured and on which the operation of the corporate debtor depends, operational debts are usually unsecured, of a shorter duration and of lesser amount. The two cannot be equated. Further the financial strength and nature of business of a financial creditor cannot be compared with that of an Operational Creditor, engaged in supply of goods and services as the “impact of the non-payment of admitted dues could be far more serious on an Operational Creditor than on a financial creditor.” Therefore, a little more flexibility has been conferred to admit the application of the financial creditor. The Court held that “If facts and circumstances so warrant, the Adjudicating Authority can keep the admission in abeyance or even reject the application.” The Court, however, clarified that once the application under section 7 is rejected by the Adjudicatory Authority but its dues continue to remain unpaid, the financial creditor may apply afresh for initiation of CIRP.

The Court while concluding touched upon the difference between a company temporarily defaulting in repayment of its financial debts and a company which has actually become insolvent or bankrupt. It is only in the latter circumstances that the question of time bound initiation and completion of CIRP shall arise. The Court further clarified that the judgment in Swiss Ribbons case was delivered in the context of a challenge to the vires of the IBC. It does not consider the question of whether Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC is mandatory or discretionary and thus shall not be applicable to the issue involved in the case in hand. The Court cautioned that ordinarily the Adjudicatory Authority shall admit the application under section 7 of the IBC where the twin conditions are fulfilled. It is only when there are good reasons not to admit the petition that the NCLT shall exercise its discretion to decide otherwise. The Supreme Court thus gave its judgment setting aside the impugned order and directing the NCLT to reconsider the matter in the light of the prevailing law.

28 Jul

Object Of IBC is Not To Penalize Solvent Companies For Non-Payment Of Disputed Dues: Reaffirmed by Hon’ble Apex Court

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Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) filed an application under section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Kolkata, for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against HPCL Biofuels Ltd. (HBL), a wholly owned subsidiary of HPCL. NCLT allowed the application while rejecting the contention raised by HBL that there were pre-existing disputes between the parties in respect of the claim. National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, on appeal, set aside the order of NCLT which was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S S.S. Engineers & Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4583 OF 2022].

S.S. Engineers & Ors. (the “Appellant”) and HBL entered into a contract agreement pursuant to tenders floated by HBL for enhancing the capacity of the Boiling Houses. Purchase Orders were issued by HBL to the Appellant for the work on a turnkey basis. The Appellant raised invoices in respect of the purchase orders. HBL, through mails, disputed any liability of payment alleging that Appellant had been violating the terms of the purchase order and backing out from its commitments causing huge losses to HBL as it had to procure materials from other vendors. The Appellant allegedly also raised invoices for material that were not supplied and that did not renew its Bank Guarantee and delivered poor quality materials.

While all this was communicated to the Appellant by HBL, the latter issued Form C to the Appellant under Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act read with Rules 12(1) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. The Appellant issued a Legal Notice for invocation of arbitration, followed by Demand Notice under section 8 of the IBC. HBL disputed the claim. Nonetheless, the Appellant filed an application for initiation of CIRP against HBL. The NCLT was of the opinion that even if all the amount disputed by HBL is taken into consideration, the amount due to the Appellant shall exceed Rs. 1 Lakh (threshold limit under section 4 of IBC at the relevant time). Moreover, since HBL awarded new work orders to the Appellant subsequently, it meant that all the disputes relating to the contract were resolved. Further, NCLT also underlined the fact that HBL had also issued Form C.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the first instance clarified that the statutory duty of issuance of C-forms under the Central Sales Tax, do not and cannot constitute acknowledgment of any liability to make payment. While quoting from the judgment in Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353, the Court reiterated the three questions that need to be examined by the Adjudicating Authority in order to determine an application under section 9 of the IBC – (i) whether there was an operational debt exceeding Rupees 1,00,000/( Rupees One Lac); (ii) whether the evidence furnished with the application showed that debt exceeding Rupees one lac was due and payable and had not till then been paid; and (ii) whether there was existence of any dispute between the parties or the record of pendency of a suit or arbitration proceedings filed before the receipt of demand notice in relation to such dispute. Additionally, the adjudicating authority must follow the mandate of Section 9(5) of the IBC. The adjudicating authority must reject the application under Section 9(5)(2)(d) if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor. What Court has to essentially examine is “…whether there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation and that the “dispute” is not a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence.” The Tribunal shall not examine the merits of the dispute and determine if defence is likely to succeed. The Court also referred to its judgment in K Kishan vs. Vijay Nirman Co. (P) Ltd. (2018) 17 SCC 662 wherein the Court ruled that the “Code cannot be used in terrorem” to extract moneys. It held that “operational creditors cannot use the Insolvency Code either prematurely or for extraneous considerations or as a substitute for debt enforcement procedures.” Applying the law laid previously by the Apex Court, it was observed that HBL had been disputing the claims of the Appellant which evinces a real dispute in terms of the IBC and thus, there was no reason to interfere with the ruling of the NCLAT.

24 Jul

Har Ghar Khadi Ka Tiranga: The New Law w.r.t. National Flag

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CommonMan

‘Har Ghar Tiranga’ is a campaign being promoted by the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India under the aegis of Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav to encourage people to bring the Tiranga home and hoist it on their houses from 13^th to 15^th August, 2022 to mark the 75^th year of India’s independence.[1]

Indian Flag was adopted on 22^nd July, 1947. The display, hoisting, and use of the Indian National Flag is presently governed by the Flag Code of India, 2002 and Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971. The Flag Code brings together all laws, conventions, practices, and instructions for the display of the National Flag and governs the display of the National Flag by private, public, and Government institutions. As the law stood earlier, machine made and polyester flags were not allowed to be used and “hand-spun and woven wool or cotton or silk khadi bunting” were only allowed. Further, the import of machine-made flags was banned in 2019 in order to boost the Khadi industry. The tricolour was allowed to be flown from sunrise to sunset only, irrespective of weather conditions.

Not very long ago, the Flag Code of India, 2002 has been amended vide Order dated 30^th December, 2021 and National Flag made of polyester or machine made Flag have now been allowed. The Code has been further amended on 20^th July, 2022 to state that where the Flag is displayed in open or displayed on the house of member of public, it may be flown day and night. On 20^th of July, 2022, the Home Ministry, Government of India has issued a direction bearing no. D.O. No. 2/01/2020-Public (Part-III) addressed to all the Ministries and Departments of the Government asking them to publicize the said changes to the general public.

In order to boost the campaign, all Post Offices in the country will start selling flags from 1^st August 2022. Apart from physically hoisting the flag, the Ministry of Culture has launched a website where one can ‘Pin a Flag’ and also post a ‘Selfie with Flag’ to showcase one’s patriotism.[2]

Ironically, despite such zeal and promotion, the outcome of the said amendment does not seem to be very pretty when one looks at the ground situation. One, the size specified under the campaign is 20×30 inches and 16×27 inches. This is not permitted under the BIS’ standards for the National Flag. Some manufacturers, which are BIS approved, are finding it practically difficult to manufacture the flags as per the changed dimensions. Secondly, the manufacturers of Khadi Flags are shocked on National Flag made of polyester being allowed. According to them the sanctity of the tricolour has been played down rather demeaned by allowing polyester cloth. All those involved in the Khadi and Village Industries are struggling with relatively very less orders or no orders at all. The situation is grim.

Where on one hand, the Government has banned items made of single use plastic, allowing another form of plastic – polyester – to be used for making Flags seems to be an aberration in the overall policy. Also this seems to defeat the objective of promotion of Khadi industry by the Government. Khadi Sanghas have written to the Prime Minister and Home Minister seeking withdrawal of the amendment while they have planned a symbolic protest on July 27. This amendment, however, may have an explanation. One reason of introducing polyester is the difference in price of raw material . Polyester is cheap. Khadi, on the other hand, is facing a steep hike in price (highest in last decade) due to fall in the production of cotton in the country.

In this light, promotion and our support should rather go with showing solidarity with Khadi industry. Demand for National Flags made of Khadi can make a difference. Lets do a “Har Ghar Khadi ka Tiranga” instead of just celebrating “Har Ghar Tiranga” on this platinum celebration of Nation’s Independence Day.

[1] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1844020

[2] https://rashtragaan.in/, https://harghartiranga.com/

24 Jul

Supreme Court Upholds Woman’s right to Reproductive Choice, Bodily Integrity And Autonomy: An Unmarried Woman’s Right To Safe Abortion

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Constitution of India

“The statute has recognized the reproductive choice of a woman and her bodily integrity and autonomy. Both these rights embody the notion that a choice must inhere in a woman on whether or not to bear a child.” – Supreme Court of India.

The law of abortion in India, as on date, lays down that a Medical Practitioner can terminate the pregnancy, provided, the pregnancy does not exceed 20 weeks [Section 3(2) (a) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (“1971 Act”)]. Where the pregnancy exceeds 20 weeks but does not exceed 24 weeks, pregnancy may be terminated if not less than two registered medical practitioners, in good faith, are of an opinion that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health or there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from any serious physical or mental abnormality [Section 3(2) (b) of 1971 Act]. The law further lays down the presumption that where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or preventing pregnancy, the anguish caused by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. [Explanation 1 to Section 3(2) of the 1971 Act]

As per Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 certain cases shall be considered eligible for termination of pregnancy under section 3(2)(b) of the 1971 Act. They are – survivors of sexual assault or rape or incest; minors; women whose marital status changed during the ongoing pregnancy (widowhood and divorce); women with physical major disabilities as per criteria laid down under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016; women with mental illness including mental retardation; Women developing foetal malformation that has substantial risk of being incompatible with life or if the child is born it may suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously handicapped; and women with pregnancy in humanitarian settings or disaster or emergency situations as may be declared by the Government.

A Division Bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Justices Sathish Chandra Sharma, CJ and Subramonium Prasad, J recently came across a pressing question where the Petitioner, an unmarried woman of 25 years, in her interim application in the Writ sought the relief of termination of pregnancy ( being 24 weeks pregnant) that arose out of a consensual relationship. that did not last. The Court dismissed the application and declined the interim relief stating that “As of today, Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003, stands, and this Court, while exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950, cannot go beyond the Statute. Granting interim relief now would amount to allowing the writ petition itself.” [Ms. X v. The Principal Secretary Health And Family Welfare Department, Government of India W.P.(C) 10602/2022 CM APPL. 30708/2022 decided on 15.07.2022]

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the appeal against the said order of the Hon’ble High Court [X v. Health And Family Welfare Department, Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).12612/2022] passed an order dated 21.07.2022 observing that the order of the High court was unduly restrictive. Although the Court observed that Rule 3B of the 2003 Rules does not contemplate a situation involving unmarried women, the Court also did not find any reason to deny the relief to an unmarried woman. The Court cited the following reasons:

the legislature has not intended to make a distinction between a married and unmarried woman;
same choice is available to other categories of women;
the distinction between a married and unmarried woman does not bear a nexus to the basic purpose and object which is sought to be achieved by Parliament under the Legislation;
The Parliamentary intent, is not to confine the beneficial provisions of the 1971 Act only to a situation involving a matrimonial relationship;
Parliament by amending the 1971 Act in 2021 intended to include unmarried women and single women within the ambit of the Act which is evident from the replacement of the word ‘husband’ with ‘partner’ in Explanation I of Section 3(2) of the Act;
allowing the petitioner to suffer an unwanted pregnancy would be contrary to the intent of the law enacted by Parliament;
allowing the petitioner to terminate her pregnancy, on a proper interpretation of the statute, prima facie, falls within the ambit of the statute;
Explanation 1 to Section 3 of the Act – Explanation 1 expressly contemplates a situation involving an unwanted pregnancy caused as a result of the failure of any device or method used by a woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the number of children or preventing pregnancy;
The expression “change of marital status” in clause (c) of Rule 3B should be given a purposive rather than a restrictive interpretation and expressions “widowhood and divorce” need not be construed to be exhaustive of the category which precedes;
Now even live-in relationships have been recognized by the Supreme Court. [In S Khusboo v. Kanniammal (2010) 5 SCC 600 it was held that “Notions of social morality are inherently subjective and the criminal law cannot be used as a means to unduly interfere with the domain of personal autonomy.”]

The Court in unequivocal terms has laid down the law that “A woman’s right to reproductive choice is an inseparable part of her personal liberty under Article 21 of Constitution. She has a sacrosanct right to bodily integrity.”The Court further observed that denying an unmarried woman the right to a safe abortion violates her personal autonomy and freedom.

The Court while delivering the judgment relied on Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh Administration [(2009) 9 SCC 1]wherein the Court had held that “If a woman does not want to continue with the pregnancy, then forcing her to do so represents a violation of the woman’s bodily integrity and aggravates her mental trauma which would be deleterious to her mental health”. Similarly, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors, [(2017) 10 SCC 1], the Court had held that the decision of a woman to procreate or abstain from procreating has been recognized as a facet of her right to lead a life with dignity and the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.

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