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Adoptive Mother Should Be Entitled To Maternity Leave Of 12 Weeks, Irrespective Of The Age Of The Adopted Child: SC

Constitution of India, Employment Law, Maternity Leave

Most fairly, while striking down Section 60(4) of the Social Security Code, 2020 (which came into effect on 21.11.2025) as unconstitutional, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India [W.P.(C) No. 960/2021], has held that “A woman who legally adopts a child, or a commissioning mother, shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of 12 weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be.”

The Court specifically held that maternity is not only a basis human right but it is also a right constitutionally guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Social Security Code, 2020 which came into effect on 21.11.2025, amended and consolidated all laws relating to social security, including that of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. Section 60 of the Social Security Code, 2020 provides for the Right to payment of maternity benefit. Sub-clause (4) to Section 60 restricted the entitlement of leave of an adoptive mother only in cases where the child adopted is less than the age of three months. As per the sub-section, “A woman who legally adopts a child below the age of three months or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be.” The Court was of the opinion that the age-based distinction is not a rational classification and “The age limit renders the provision illusory and devoid of practical application.” The Court rationalised that the maternal responsibilities of a woman adopting a child above 3 months are the same as those of a woman adopting a child aged less than 3 months.
The decision was given by a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan did not stop to grant relief to the adoptive mother who had moved the PIL but further went on to urge the Union Government to recognise law on paternity leave as a vital component of child welfare and gender equality . The Court opined that “On the need of paternity leave, we urge the Union to come up with a provision recognising paternity leave as a social security benefit. We emphasise that the duration of such leave must be determined in a manner that is responsive to the needs of both the parents and the child.”

The Hon’ble Bench showed its societal concerns by stating that “”The absence of paternity leave produces two consequences. First, it reinforces gendered roles in parenting. Secondly, even where a father is willing and desirous of contributing, he is left without a meaningful opportunity to do so. When fathers are afforded the opportunity to take leave following the arrival of the child, they are able to support mother and share family responsibilities. This support extends to participating in the upbringing and caregiving of the child, assisting with household responsibilities, and remaining emotionally present during this demanding phase.” Court was of the opinion that a provision for paternity leave serves an important purpose by enabling fathers to participate meaningfully in the early stages of a child’s life and development. It helps in dismantling gendered roles, encourages fathers to take an active role in child care, fosters a balanced understanding of parenting, and promotes gender equality within family and workplace. It also advances the best interests and welfare of the child, which are most effectively served when both parents are enabled to play meaningful and complementary roles in the child’s growth and development.

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‘Court’ in Section 29A is Court as Defined in Section 2(1)(e) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: SC

Arbitration

Most recently in the matter of Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. [SLP (C) NO(S).10944-10945 OF 2025], Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the ‘Court’ in Section 29A is Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court it was held that that the once an arbitrator has been appointed through the judicial process, the Courts become functus officio and applications seeking extension of mandate under Section 29A are to be filed before Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e). The Court further affirmed the decision in State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. [(2018) 2 SCC 602] affirming the decision in Associated Contracts that solely because a superior Court appoints the arbitrator, or issues directions or has retained some control over the arbitrator, it cannot be regarded as a ‘Court’ of first instance for purposes of Section 42.

In the facts of the case, one of the parties, Appellant, after the original period of 1 year in the arbitration proceeding coming to an end, filed application for extension under Section 29A before the Commercial Court, which allowed the application. The decision of extension under section 29A was challenged in a writ petition on account of appointment of the arbitrator by the High Court under Section 11. The Single Bench of High Court referred the matter to the Division Bench set aside the order of the Commercial Court and permitted the parties to approach the High Court for extension of time. The Appellant came before Supreme Court contending that the Commercial Court alone is the appropriate Court under Section 29A read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.

The question of law referred to the Division Bench of the Apex Court was can an application to extend time under Section 29A of the Act can be filed before the High Court or the Civil Court, if an arbitral tribunal – appointed by the High Court or by the parties concerned does not complete proceedings within the required or extended time limit?

The Court analysed the conflicting judgments of High Courts and thereafter deep dived into the scheme of the 1996 Act to decipher the meaning of “court” used in section 29A.

The Court observed that a plain reading of the provisions of the Act suggests that the term “court” used in Section 29-A is to be read with Section 2(1)(e)(i) which refers to either the Principal Civil Court or the High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction, depending on the pecuniary jurisdiction in a given case. The Court reasoned out the interpretation by firstly stating that if the legislature had intended to restrict the power to substitute arbitrators under Section 29-A(4), as it did under Section 11 in relation to appointment of an arbitrator, it would have specifically provided in Section 29-A or used language similar to that in Section 15(2) of the Act. The omission of any such language in Section 29-A suggests that reference to the definition of “court” under Section 2(1)(e) can be made. It was observed that Section 14(2) of Act further reinforces this view, as it allows a party to apply to the “Court” for termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, a provision that has also raised questions about which “Court” holds jurisdiction. Moreover, Sections 9 and 34, akin to Section 29-A, use the term “court”, and in such cases as well, the definition under Section 2(1)(e) is applied for determining the appropriate forum for filing these applications. It was held that once an arbitrator is appointed under the Act, the Court loses jurisdiction and becomes functus officio. Therefore, the role of the High Court in appointing the arbitrator does not necessarily extend to the power to substitute the arbitrator or extend time under Section 29-A(4). It was clarified that the power to substitute an arbitrator is consequential and must be exercised by the “Court” empowered to extend the time under Section 29-A(4) of the Act, which may, in some cases, be the Principal Civil Court, rather than the High Court.

Therefore, from a bare reading of Section 2(1)(e)(i), what emerges is that in domestic arbitrations, the term “court” includes the Principal Civil Court, which also encompasses High Courts with ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Interpreting Section 29-A(4) to mean that only the Supreme Court or High Court can extend the mandate of an arbitrator appointed by it would, therefore, contradict the legislative intent. Instead, Section 29-A(4) allows for a broader interpretation that aligns with the framework established under the Act. Conclusion The interpretation of the term “court” under Section 29-A(4) of the Act remains contentious with conflicting judicial pronouncements adding to the uncertainty. Despite these inconsistencies, a contextual and harmonious reading of the provisions suggests that the definition of “court” under Section 2(1)(e) could be applied to determine the appropriate forum. Accordingly, in domestic arbitrations, either the Principal Civil Court or the High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction, depending on the pecuniary limits in a given case, may be approached to extend the mandate of the arbitrator.

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