‘Court’ in Section 29A is Court as Defined in Section 2(1)(e) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: SC
Most recently in the matter of Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. [SLP (C) NO(S).10944-10945 OF 2025], Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the ‘Court’ in Section 29A is Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court it was held that that the once an arbitrator has been appointed through the judicial process, the Courts become functus officio and applications seeking extension of mandate under Section 29A are to be filed before Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e). The Court further affirmed the decision in State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. [(2018) 2 SCC 602] affirming the decision in Associated Contracts that solely because a superior Court appoints the arbitrator, or issues directions or has retained some control over the arbitrator, it cannot be regarded as a ‘Court’ of first instance for purposes of Section 42.
In the facts of the case, one of the parties, Appellant, after the original period of 1 year in the arbitration proceeding coming to an end, filed application for extension under Section 29A before the Commercial Court, which allowed the application. The decision of extension under section 29A was challenged in a writ petition on account of appointment of the arbitrator by the High Court under Section 11. The Single Bench of High Court referred the matter to the Division Bench set aside the order of the Commercial Court and permitted the parties to approach the High Court for extension of time. The Appellant came before Supreme Court contending that the Commercial Court alone is the appropriate Court under Section 29A read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
The question of law referred to the Division Bench of the Apex Court was can an application to extend time under Section 29A of the Act can be filed before the High Court or the Civil Court, if an arbitral tribunal – appointed by the High Court or by the parties concerned does not complete proceedings within the required or extended time limit?
The Court analysed the conflicting judgments of High Courts and thereafter deep dived into the scheme of the 1996 Act to decipher the meaning of “court” used in section 29A.
The Court observed that a plain reading of the provisions of the Act suggests that the term “court” used in Section 29-A is to be read with Section 2(1)(e)(i) which refers to either the Principal Civil Court or the High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction, depending on the pecuniary jurisdiction in a given case. The Court reasoned out the interpretation by firstly stating that if the legislature had intended to restrict the power to substitute arbitrators under Section 29-A(4), as it did under Section 11 in relation to appointment of an arbitrator, it would have specifically provided in Section 29-A or used language similar to that in Section 15(2) of the Act. The omission of any such language in Section 29-A suggests that reference to the definition of “court” under Section 2(1)(e) can be made. It was observed that Section 14(2) of Act further reinforces this view, as it allows a party to apply to the “Court” for termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, a provision that has also raised questions about which “Court” holds jurisdiction. Moreover, Sections 9 and 34, akin to Section 29-A, use the term “court”, and in such cases as well, the definition under Section 2(1)(e) is applied for determining the appropriate forum for filing these applications. It was held that once an arbitrator is appointed under the Act, the Court loses jurisdiction and becomes functus officio. Therefore, the role of the High Court in appointing the arbitrator does not necessarily extend to the power to substitute the arbitrator or extend time under Section 29-A(4). It was clarified that the power to substitute an arbitrator is consequential and must be exercised by the “Court” empowered to extend the time under Section 29-A(4) of the Act, which may, in some cases, be the Principal Civil Court, rather than the High Court.
Therefore, from a bare reading of Section 2(1)(e)(i), what emerges is that in domestic arbitrations, the term “court” includes the Principal Civil Court, which also encompasses High Courts with ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Interpreting Section 29-A(4) to mean that only the Supreme Court or High Court can extend the mandate of an arbitrator appointed by it would, therefore, contradict the legislative intent. Instead, Section 29-A(4) allows for a broader interpretation that aligns with the framework established under the Act. Conclusion The interpretation of the term “court” under Section 29-A(4) of the Act remains contentious with conflicting judicial pronouncements adding to the uncertainty. Despite these inconsistencies, a contextual and harmonious reading of the provisions suggests that the definition of “court” under Section 2(1)(e) could be applied to determine the appropriate forum. Accordingly, in domestic arbitrations, either the Principal Civil Court or the High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction, depending on the pecuniary limits in a given case, may be approached to extend the mandate of the arbitrator.
