No Application of Sections 31(8), 31A and 38(1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 where the Fees of the Arbitral Tribunal has been fixed by Parties or by the Court in Terms of 4th Schedule
Hon’ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court recently in the matter of Jivanlal Joitaram Patel v. National Highways Authority of India[FAO (OS)(COMM) 70/2017] reaffirmed the position of law regarding when can the fee of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be fixed as per Schedule IV of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and what does the term ‘sum in dispute’ imply.
In 2018, an appeal was disposed of by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court appointing a sole arbitrator in a dispute between the Appellant and the Respondent. As per the order, the arbitral tribunal was required to fix the fee as per Schedule IV of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “1996 Act”). On entering reference, the Arbitral Tribunal vide its procedural order determined the total amount of claim and a total amount of counter claim along with the interest. Vide a subsequent procedural order, the Tribunal determined its fees in terms of ratio of the judgment of Hon’ble High Court in Rail Vikas Nigam Vs. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Both the parties objected to the fees. Therefore, the Arbitral tribunal heard both the parties on the question as to whether counter claim(s) is/are to be included cumulatively along with the claims in the expression “sum in dispute” appearing in the 4th Schedule of the 1996, or the claim amount and counter claim amount are to be separately considered in terms of proviso to Section 38(1) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal held that applicable arbitral fee has to be assessed separately for the claim, and counter claim. The reasoning inter alia was based on the ground that proviso to Section 38(1) of the Act carves out a specific exception providing for Arbitral Tribunal to fix a separate fee for claims and counter claims. It was further observed by the Ld. Arbitral tribunal that “…combining claims and counter claims for the purposes of determining fee under the 4th Schedule could result in inequitable situations contrary to the express language of Section 38(1) of the Act.” The Ld. Arbitral Tribunal drew a parallel from the law and practice in civil suits where the court fees is determined separately in case of counter claims.
The parties filed application before the Hon’ble Court seeking clarification regarding the moot question. Both the parties were not in dispute regarding the correctness of the decision in Delhi State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bawana Infra Development Pvt. Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9241 wherein it was held that “sum in dispute” would include both – the claim and counter claim amounts taken cumulatively. It was held that Sections 38(1) does not have any bearing on the interpretation of 4th Schedule. The Hon’ble Court approved the decision in Delhi State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. and held that proviso to Section 38(1) of the Act will apply only when the Arbitral Tribunal fixes its own fee and not when fees has to be fixed as per 4th Schedule of 1996 Act. Therefore, Section 38(1) of the Act cannot be resorted to for interpretation of the expression “sums in dispute” provided under 4th Schedule.
The Hon’ble Court clarified that unlike in a civil suit where the counter claim can be with respect to entirely different transaction, the counter claim in an arbitration proceeding has to necessarily arise from the same contract and arbitration agreement. This is the reason why the court fees in case of a counter claim is to be calculated and affixed separately. The Court observed that “[T]herefore, in the context of arbitration proceedings it may not be correct to say that counter claim would be an “independent” cause of action”.
The Court further relied upon the judgment in National Highways Authority of India Vs. Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited 2019 SCC OnLine SC 906 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if there is an agreement between the parties which lays down the fee structure for the arbitral tribunal then the fee will be fixed in terms of the agreement between the parties and not the 4th Schedule to the Act. Therefore, it was concluded by the Hon’ble Court that Sections 31(8), 31A and Section 38(1) of the 1996 Act of the 1996 Act has no application in interpreting the expression ‘sums in dispute’ as provided in Schedule IV of the 1996 Act or in determination of Arbitral Tribunal fees if the fee structure has been expressly agreed between the parties.