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No Application of Sections 31(8), 31A and 38(1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 where the Fees of the Arbitral Tribunal has been fixed by Parties or by the Court in Terms of 4th Schedule

Arbitration

Hon’ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court recently in the matter of Jivanlal Joitaram Patel v. National Highways Authority of India[FAO (OS)(COMM) 70/2017] reaffirmed the position of law regarding when can the fee of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be fixed as per Schedule IV of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and what does the term ‘sum in dispute’ imply.

In 2018, an appeal was disposed of by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court appointing a sole arbitrator in a dispute between the Appellant and the Respondent. As per the order, the arbitral tribunal was required to fix the fee as per Schedule IV of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter “1996 Act”). On entering reference, the Arbitral Tribunal vide its procedural order determined the total amount of claim and a total amount of counter claim along with the interest. Vide a subsequent procedural order, the Tribunal determined its fees in terms of ratio of the judgment of Hon’ble High Court in Rail Vikas Nigam Vs. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Both the parties objected to the fees. Therefore, the Arbitral tribunal heard both the parties on the question as to whether counter claim(s) is/are to be included cumulatively along with the claims in the expression “sum in dispute” appearing in the 4th Schedule of the 1996, or the claim amount and counter claim amount are to be separately considered in terms of proviso to Section 38(1) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal held that applicable arbitral fee has to be assessed separately for the claim, and counter claim. The reasoning inter alia was based on the ground that proviso to Section 38(1) of the Act carves out a specific exception providing for Arbitral Tribunal to fix a separate fee for claims and counter claims. It was further observed by the Ld. Arbitral tribunal that “…combining claims and counter claims for the purposes of determining fee under the 4th Schedule could result in inequitable situations contrary to the express language of Section 38(1) of the Act.” The Ld. Arbitral Tribunal drew a parallel from the law and practice in civil suits where the court fees is determined separately in case of counter claims.

The parties filed application before the Hon’ble Court seeking clarification regarding the moot question. Both the parties were not in dispute regarding the correctness of the decision in Delhi State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bawana Infra Development Pvt. Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9241 wherein it was held that “sum in dispute” would include both – the claim and counter claim amounts taken cumulatively. It was held that Sections 38(1) does not have any bearing on the interpretation of 4th Schedule. The Hon’ble Court approved the decision in Delhi State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. and held that proviso to Section 38(1) of the Act will apply only when the Arbitral Tribunal fixes its own fee and not when fees has to be fixed as per 4th Schedule of 1996 Act.  Therefore, Section 38(1) of the Act cannot be resorted to for interpretation of the expression “sums in dispute” provided under 4th Schedule.

The Hon’ble Court clarified that unlike in a civil suit where the counter claim can be with respect to entirely different transaction, the counter claim in an arbitration proceeding has to necessarily arise from the same contract and arbitration agreement. This is the reason why the court fees in case of a counter claim is to be calculated and affixed separately. The Court observed that “[T]herefore, in the context of arbitration proceedings it may not be correct to say that counter claim would be an “independent” cause of action”.

The Court further relied upon the judgment in National Highways Authority of India Vs. Gayatri Jhansi Roadways Limited 2019 SCC OnLine SC 906 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if there is an agreement between the parties which lays down the fee structure for the arbitral tribunal then the fee will be fixed in terms of the agreement between the parties and not the 4th Schedule to the Act. Therefore, it was concluded by the Hon’ble Court that Sections 31(8), 31A and Section 38(1) of the 1996 Act of the 1996 Act has no application in interpreting the expression ‘sums in dispute’ as provided in Schedule IV of the 1996 Act or in determination of Arbitral Tribunal fees if the fee structure has been expressly agreed between the parties.

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Can a power of attorney be cancelled by simply writing ‘cancelled’ on it?

Specific Contracts

The issue regarding the revocation of a registered power of attorney (“PoA”) was addressed most recently in the matter of Amar Nath v. Gian Chand [2022 SCC OnLine SC 102] decided on January 28, 2022 by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the said matter the plaintiff had executed a special power of attorney in favour of the Defendant No. 2 for the sale of plaintiff’s property in favour of Defendant No. 1. The Defendant No. 1, however, was not in a position to arrange for money and Defendant No. 2 PURPORTEDLY surrendered the original power of attorney to the plaintiff and the plaintiff drew a cut line on the document and wrote ‘cancelled’. According to plaintiff he also told Defendant No. 1 that the same stood cancelled. Subsequently Defendant No. 2, allegedly in collusion with Defendant No. 1, applied for the copy of the power of attorney, and fraudulently executed the sale deed in between themselves for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/-. The mutation was also sanctioned. On becoming aware of it, the plaintiff challenged the sale deed by filing a suit for declaration by way of permanent injunction mainly on the grounds firstly that the Defendant No. 2, during the registration of the sale deed, could not have produced the original PoA before the registering officer under Registration Act and secondly, the sale deed was executed without authority since special power of attorney was deemed to have been cancelled.

The trial court declined to grant relief of declaration by way of permanent injunction. The first Appellate court held that the sale deed was valid and the case of the plaintiff, that the power of attorney was cancelled was unsustainable. The High Court proceeded to set aside the findings of the lower courts and held that the mutation showing the sale in favour of the Defendant no. 1 was null and void as per Section 18 (meant to actually refer to 18A) of the Registration Act, 1908. As per section 18A, it was necessary for the Registering Authority to see the true copy of the special power of attorney. Since original power of attorney was cancelled, the same could not be relied upon by the Registering Authority for the purpose of execution of the sale deed.

The Apex Court started by looking into the relevant provisions of Registration Act. The Court observed that Section 18A contemplates the production of a true copy of a document which is sought to be registered. In the present case it was the sale deed and the production of the sale deed is not in question. The Court then went on to analyse the applicability of other provisions under section 32, 33 and 34 of the Registration Act. As per section 32, every document to be registered must be presented by person executing or the representative or an agent of such person. Section 34 deals with enquiry before registration by registering officer. It requires the persons executing the document to be present in person at the time of registration. It has been decided in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar (2009) 14 SCC 782 that section 32 of the Registration Act mandates the presence of the actual persons who executed the document sought to be registered.  It was held that “Where a person holds a power of attorney which authorises him to execute a document as agent for someone else, and he executes a document under the terms of the power of attorney, he is, so far as the registration office is concerned, the actual executant of the document and is entitled under Section 32(a) to present it for registration and get it registered.”

Drawing a parallel, the Court observed that in the present matter there was a true copy of power of attorney which authorised Defendant No. 2 and if it was not cancelled and he had executed the sale deed, he is within his rights to present the documents before the registering officer. The Court also observed that the duty of the Registering Officer extends only to enquire and find that such person is the person who has executed the document he has presented and further be satisfied about the identity of the person. He is duty bound to satisfy himself of a right of such a person to so appear. In case of an agent, thus, he is bound to produce the power of attorney to the Registering officer. Section 33(4) of the Act further states that once the same has been produced, power of attorney is proved and requires no further proof.

The Court after dissecting the relevant provisions of the Registration Act, concluded that if the registering Authority is satisfied about the identity of the person and that he admits the execution of the document, the officer may not need to enquire further. The court therefore rejected the argument of the plaintiff that the non-production of the original power of attorney by the Defendant No. 2 was fatal to a valid registration of the sale deed.

The Court then turned on to the contention of the plaintiff that original power of attorney was cancelled by cutting it and writing on it ‘cancelled’ and thus Defendant No. 2 had no authority thereafter.

The Court, in this regard, observed that the power of attorney was registered. The only question therefore which required to be answered was whether the power of attorney was cancelled before the execution of the sale deed. If yes, whether the cancellation was effected in a valid and legal manner and finally, whether it was made known to not only to the Defendant no. 2 i.e. the agent but also to the Defendant no. 1 i.e. the third party.

The Court then analysed the provisions of Chapter X of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Court taking note of Section 208 of the Indian Contract Act, observed the principles of contract of agency that a termination of such contract, even if valid, shall not operate against a third party who was not notified. The third party who in good faith entered into contract with the agent in ignorance of the revocation shall be protected. The Court appreciated the facts where the plaintiff had asserted that the deed of PoA was surrendered. The Defendant No. 2 on the other hand stated that the PoA was misplaced and he had to apply for a certified copy. The Court further appreciated that although the oral evidence may be contradictory, and may not be of much help, the letter of the plaintiff to Defendant No. 2 written subsequent to the alleged dated of surrender of the PoA clarifies that the PoA was not surrendered on the date asserted by the plaintiff. In the said letter, the plaintiff has made reference to the PoA and asked the Defendant No. 2 to do the needful and send the money on selling the property. The Defendant No. 2 also informed the plaintiff of the sale by his letter although he could not immediately meet and give the money to the plaintiff due to personal difficulties.

On the aspect of cancellation, the Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff neither did get the power of attorney cancelled at the Sub-Registrar Office nor did he send any notice of cancellation. The Court clarified that “This we say as even in the absence of a registered cancellation of the power of attorney, there must be cancellation and it must further be brought to the notice of the third party at any rate as already noticed.”

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Whether Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 Ousts the Jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum

Consumer

The Apex Court in the matter of Vodafone Idea Cellular Ltd v. Ajay Kumar Agarwal [Civil Appeal No 923 of 2017] decided on 16 February, 2022 held that telecom services provided by a private company comes within the definition of services and section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act which provides for a statutory arbitration does not oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer For a under Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

The complaint was filed by the Respondent against the Appellant seeking inter alia compensation in tune of Rs. 22,000/- on account of excessive billing between 8 November 2013 and 7 December 2013. The Appellant filed an application challenging the maintainability of the complaint on the ground that according to General Manager, Telecom v. M Krishnan and Another (2009) 8 SCC 481, it is not a service provider. The District Forum preliminarily observed that private telecom service provider is not a ‘telegraph authority’ for the purposes of Section 7B of the Indian Telegraphic Act, 1885 and asked the Appellant to file its written statement.

The order of the District Forum was challenged by the Appellant. The State Commission held that the issue of jurisdiction could be raised as a preliminary issue. The State Commission further relied upon the judgment in Bharthi Hexacom Ltd. v. Komal Prakash [Misc Application No. 204/2014 in Revision Petition Application No. 12] wherein it was held that “for a dispute under Sect. 7(B) between Private Service Provider and Consumer the authority cannot take decision because, for Private Service provider any arrangement is not made in the above act … hence, the Learned Consumer Forum has the jurisdiction to hear, decide and dispose of the dispute between the Private service Provider and consumer”.

The National Commission affirmed the decision of State Commission.

On appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court framed the following issue for determination – whether the existence of a remedy under Section 7B of the Act of 1885 ousts the jurisdiction of the consumer forum under the Consumer Protection Act 1986?

The Court started with analysis of the jurisdiction of District Forum provided under Section 11 and definitions of ‘service’ provided under section 2(o) and ‘deficiency’  provided under section 2(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Court observed that the language employed under the provision shows that definition of ‘service’  is very wide particularly by use of expressions – “service of any description which is made available to potential users”, “means and includes”, “but not limited to”. The expression ‘service’ is wide enough to mean service of any description.

Section 7B of the Telegraph Act provides for arbitration. Accordingly, “any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government”. The Appellant while relying on section 7B argued that Appellant being a telecom service provider, the subscriber/Respondent has the remedy to invoke arbitration as per section 7B of the Telegraph Act.

With regards to the overriding effect of Telegraph Act, the Court observed that both are special enactments. While the Telegraph Act is for regulating telegraphs, Consumer Act, 1986 is a later enactment and is intended to protect the interest and welfare of consumers. It was emphasised by the Court that Consumer Protection Act, 1986 being a later enactment, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be lightly assumed unless express words are used or such a consequence follows by necessary implication. Addressing the contention of the Appellant that telecom services were incorporated only in the new legislation i.e. Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Court held that “specification of services in Section 2(s) of the earlier Act of 1986 was illustrative” and therefore the argument was declined.

With regard to provision of arbitration under Section 7D of the Telegraph Act, the Court observed that the remedy of arbitration is statutory in nature but this does not retrain the applicability of law laid down by the Apex Court in Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh (2019) 12 SCC 751. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that an arbitration agreement shall not oust the jurisdiction of consumer fora. The Court added that section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides that “the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force” further strengthens the argument. The Court had held that Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides for a special remedy to a consumer which is in addition to the remedies that can be availed of by them. Remedies include arbitration and also special statutes [Imperia Structures Ltd. v Anil Patni (2020) 10 SCC 783]. A person/party has in such circumstances. In IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna [2021 SCC OnLine SC 277] it was observed that if a person has at its disposal two remedies, he “can make the choice to elect either of the remedies as long as the ambit and scope of the two remedies is not essentially different.” This emerges from the doctrine of election. In the case of IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. the consumer/complainant, who was an allottee, also had the choice of proceeding under RERA.

The accordingly concluded by stating that in the present matter “It would be open to a consumer to opt for the remedy of arbitration, but there is no compulsion in law to do so and it would be open to a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies which are provided under the Act of 1986, now replaced by the Act of 2019.”

The Court once again clarified that the insertion of the expression ‘telecom services’ in the definition which is contained in Section 2(42) of the Act of 2019 cannot be construed to mean that telecom services were excluded from the jurisdiction of the consumer forum under the Act of 1986. The definition of the expression ‘service’ in Section 2(o) of the Act of 1986 was wide enough to embrace services of every description including telecom services.

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Secured Creditor Cannot be Restrained from Selling the Mortgaged Property Unless on Payment of Total Outstanding

Bank And Financial

In the matter of Bank of Baroda v. M/s Karwa Trading Company & Anr. [CIVIL APPEAL NO.363 OF 2022] decided on 10.02.2022, Hon’ble Supreme Court disposed of an appeal filed by the secured creditor and held that the Appellant Bank cannot be restrained from selling the mortgaged property by holding the public auction and realise the amount and then proceeding to recover the balance of outstanding dues, unless the borrower deposits/pays the entire amount due and payable along with the costs incurred by the secured creditor as on the date of Demand Notice as per Section 13(f) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”).

The Appellant Bank in the matter extended a term loan of Rs. 100 Lakhs and cash credit limit of Rs.95 lakhs in favour of the Respondent against the security of two properties, a land and a residential unit. On Respondent having failed to repay the loan, the Appellant Bank issued notice under 13(2) of SARFAESI Act demanding a sum of Rs.1,85,37,218.80/-. The Appellant took the symbolic possession of the residential unit and further issued a notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. An Application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was allowed and the Appellant took the possession of the residential unit.

The Appellant issued an auction notice and fixed Rs.48.65 lakhs as the reserve price of the residential unit. The Respondent however challenged the auction before Debt Recovery Tribunal (“DRT”) under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Vide an interim order, the DRT inter alia held that the bank shall hand over the possession of the residential unit along with the original title deeds if the borrower deposits Rs.48.65 lakhs with the bank i.e. the reserve price. The Respondent deposited the said amount.

Appellant challenged the interim order on the grounds that total debt due against the Respondent was of Rs. 2 Crore. Also Appellant had received bids up to Rs.71 lakhs and in order to redeem the mortgaged property, the Respondent must discharge the entire liability. The Appellant further contented that a payment of even a sum of Rs.71 lakhs which is the highest bid would not discharge the entire liability outstanding against the borrower. The Appellant however submitted that it would release the security if the borrower deposits Rs.71 lakhs. The Appellant also averred that the interim order was in contravention of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. On hearing the parties, the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) did not find any fault in the order and dismissed the appeal.

On appeal, the learned single Judge of the High Court set aside the order of Hon’ble DRT and DRAT on the ground that it is in contravention of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and directed the Appellant to release the secured property along with the title documents to the Respondent on latter paying Rs. 17 lakhs in addition to money already deposited with the Appellant i.e. a total sum of Rs.65.65 lakhs.

The Appellant challenged the order of the Division Bench primarily on the ground that the Division Bench has erroneously directed the release of the secured property by a total payment of merely Rs.65.65 lakhs when the total payment due from the Respondent was Rs.1,85,37,218.80/-.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. As per the provision, the secured asset shall not be sold and/or transferred by the secured creditor, where the amount dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him is tendered by the borrower or debtor to the secured creditor at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease assignment or sale of the secured assets. The Court observed that Rs.48.65 lakhs paid by the borrower was merely the base price. Therefore, since the Respondent neither deposited nor was ready to deposit the entire amount of dues along with the cost, it was open to the Appellant to sell the secured property in auction and realise the amount and the order of Division Bench was erroneous on being in contravention with Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act.

The Court further clarified that a total payment of Rs.65.65 lakhs or a total realisation of Rs. 71 lakhs by way of auction by the Appellant Bank, when the total outstanding is of Rs. 1,85,37,218.80/-, shall not discharge the Respondent and liability of the Respondent to pay the balance amount would still continue. Had the Respondent deposited a total of Rs.1,85,37,218.80/- on the date of issue of demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act dated 07.1.2013, the Appellant could have been restrained from selling the secured property.

In the light of the facts and circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that although the interim order is set aside, the main application under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act filed by the Respondent shall be decided on merits by the DRT. Further, the Appellant cannot be retrained from proceeding with the public auction and realising the amount and further recovering the outstanding dues, unless the Respondent deposits/repays the entire amount due and payable along with the costs incurred by the secured creditor as per Section 13(f) of the SARFAESI Act.

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Compensation on Account of the Failure of the Builder to Obtain the Occupation Certificate

Consumer

In the matter decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court on January 11, 2022 in Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd.  [Civil Appeal No 4000 of 2019] it was held that members of the appellant, a Cooperative Housing Society, are within their rights as ‘consumers’ to pray for compensation on account of the failure of the respondent, to obtain the occupation certificate. According to the Court, when the respondent was responsible for transferring the title of the flats to the members of the appellant along with the occupancy certificate and he failed to do so, such failure amounted to a deficiency in service. In such circumstances, the appellant has the locus to seek compensation for consequent liability which includes payment of higher taxes and water charges etc. paid to the municipal authorities by the owners i.e members of the appellant.

The respondent, a construction company, entered into agreements with the members of the Co-operative Housing Society/ appellant to sell flats to individual purchasers i.e. the members in accordance with the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act 1963 (“MOFA”). The members got the possession of the flats in 1997. However, the respondent did not obtain the occupancy certificate from the municipal authorities which made individual flat owners ineligible for electricity and water connections. The members somehow could arrange for temporary connections but then they were required to pay property tax at a rate 25% higher than the normal rate and water charges at a rate which was 50% higher than the normal charge.

The State Commission ordered in favour of the flat owners and directed the respondent to obtain the occupancy certificate and also pay, inter alia Rs. 1,00,000/- towards reimbursement of extra charges paid. The respondent however failed to comply with the demand from the members of the petitioner. The appellant approached the National Commission seeking, apart for damages on account of mental agony and inconvenience, a recompense for the excess charges and tax paid by the members of the appellant due to the deficiency in service of the respondent.

The National Commission, however, dismissed the complaint on the ground of limitation. As per the National Commission, the cause of action to file any complaint arose when the municipal authorities ordered the members to pay higher charges on temporary individual water and electricity connections. It was further held that complaint is not in nature of a consumer dispute since appellant would not fall under the definition of ‘consumer’ under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 and the respondent was not the service provider of the services for which the property tax or water charges were levied. It was municipal authorities who were the service providers.

On appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the cause of action of the appellants was founded on continuing wrong and therefore section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable. According to section 22, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach continues. The Court relied upon the judgment in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan AIR 1959 SC 798 wherein the concept of continuous cause of action has been discussed in detail. It was held by the Hon’ble Court and quoted in the judgment as follows:

“It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes acontinuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked”.

The Court further borrowed the excerpts from CWT v. Suresh Seth (1981) 2 SCC 790 and M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 which are again on the aspects of continuous cause of action.

The Court then went on to observe that the promoter of the construction company is responsible to obtain and provide the occupation certificate to the flat owners as per sections 3 and 6 of the MOFA. Promoter is further liable to make payments of outgoings such as ground rent, municipal taxes, water charges and electricity charges till the time the property is transferred to the flat-owners. The Court further reflected that the Agreement to Sell executed between the appellant and the respondent also stipulates that it is the responsibility of the respondent to obtain the occupancy certificate.

The respondent, however, repeatedly failed to fulfil its obligations, even after the directions of the State and National Commission wherein the respondent was directed to obtain the occupancy certificate. This resulted in levy of higher taxes and water charges by the municipal authority on the members of the appellant.

The Court therefore concluded by stating that “This continuous failure to obtain an occupancy certificate is a breach of the obligations imposed on the respondent under the MOFA and amounts to a continuing wrong. The appellants therefore, are entitled to damages arising out of this continuing wrong and their complaint is not barred by limitation.” While relying on judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wing Commander Arifur Rahman Khan & Others v. DLF Southern Homes Private Limited & Others (2020) 16 SCC 512 and Pioneer Urban Land Infrastructure Limited v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725, the Court also added that failure to obtain an occupancy certificate or abide by contractual obligations amounts to a deficiency in service and respondent is therefore liable in the present case.

While granting the compensation, the Court distinguished the present case from the judgment in Treaty Construction v. Ruby Tower Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (2019) 8 SCC 157, by highlighting that in the case, the Court declined to award damages “as there was no cogent basis for holding the appellant liable for compensation, and assessing the quantum of compensation or assessing the loss to the members of the respondent society.” However, in the present case, “members of the appellant society are well within their rights as ‘consumers’ to pray for compensation as a recompense for the consequent liability (such as payment of higher taxes and water charges by the owners) arising from the lack of an occupancy certificate”. Accordingly, the Court held the complaint by the appellant to be maintainable and directed the National Commission to decide the complaint on merits of the dispute.

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