Category Archives: Arbitration

It has been well established by catena of judgments that proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act“) are summary in nature and therefore, the scope of enquiry in any proceedings under Section 34 of the Act has been restricted to consider the grounds exhaustively mentioned in Section 34(2) or Section 13(5) or Section 16(6) in order to determine whether to set aside an award that has been challenged under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The thumb rule is that an application for setting aside an arbitral award would not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the Arbitral Tribunal.

In the matter of Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade Private Limited v. AMCI (India) Private Limited and Anr[1] the Court had held that framing of issues is not required as the proceedings are summary in nature. However, at the same time the Court indicated that according to section 34(2) of the Arbitration Act, an opportunity to the aggrieved party has to be afforded to prove existence of any of the grounds and allowed the applicant in the case to file affidavits of the applicant’s witnesses as “proof” and granted the respondent-defendant an opportunity to place their evidence by affidavit. The Court further went on to add that “Where the case so warrants, the court permits cross-examination of the persons swearing to the affidavit”.  

In the matter of Emkay Global Financial Services Limited v. Girdhar Sondhi[2] it was clarified thatsince after 2015 amendments to the Arbitration Act, the proceedings under section 34 have become time bound, the thumb rule of summary proceeding shall be followed and only if there were matters not contained in the record before the arbitrator, and would be relevant for determining issues arising under Section 34(2)(a), only then they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both parties. The Court further added that cross-examination of persons swearing to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary.

Since, clearly an exception has been carved out to the thumb rule, howsoever narrow, the question is how and when this exception be applied by the courts. When is it ‘absolutely necessary’ to cross examine? In a subsequent matter[3], the Apex Court further clarified the position by holding that if there is any exceptional circumstance wherein parties are required to adduce evidence in the form of an affidavit, the party must indicate on what point the party intends to adduce evidence along with disclosing specific documents or evidence that would be required to be produced. There must be specific averments in the affidavit as to the necessity and relevance of the additional evidence sought to be adduced which would be beyond the record that was before the arbitrator.

Recently, on a strong exceptional basis, the Apex Court in the matter of M/s Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashok S. Dhariwal and Others[4] allowed a party to file affidavits/additional evidence in the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and further permitted second party to cross-examine and/or produce contrary evidence. In this case, the award passed by the arbitrator was ex-parte. The respondent assailed the award under section 34 of the Arbitration Act along with the application to adduce additional evidence. The application was declined by the Court while relying on Section 34(2)(a) of the Act, as amended in the year 2019, by which expression “furnish proof” in section 34(2)(a) came to be substituted with the expression “establish on the basis of record of arbitral tribunal”. The Court explained in the following words: “the said amendment intended to limit the scope of judicial review under Section 34 of the Act only in exceptional circumstances enumerated under Section 34(2)(a) of the Act on the basis of the record available and even if the grounds urged relate to section 34(2)(b) of the Act, the applicants cannot have a right to produce additional evidence”. The order of the Court was challenged by way of writ petition before the High Court which allowed the petition and permitted the respondent to adduce the evidence while relying on judgment in Fiza Developers.

The said judgment by the Hon’ble High Court was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Court foremost observed that arbitration proceedings commenced and even the award was declared by the arbitral tribunal in the year 1998, i.e., prior to section 34(2)(a) came to be amended and therefore, pre-amendment of section 34(2)(a) shall be applicable according to which an arbitral award could be set aside by the Court if the party making an application “furnishes proof” and the grounds set out in section 34(2)(a) and section 34(2)(b) are satisfied.

The Court, therefore, applied the ratio in the judgments in Fiza Developers, Emkay Global and Canara Nidhi, and held that “if there are matters not containing such records and the relevant determination to the issues arising under section 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both the parties”. The Court observed that whereas the arbitral tribunal in the matter had passed the decree for specific performance of the contract/agreement subject to the amalgamation of the plots, the respondents, by way of application, had sought to place on record the communication from the appropriate authority by which the application for amalgamation of the plots was rejected. The case of the respondents was thus, in view of the refusal of the permission by the appropriate authority to amalgamate the plots, the case fell under section 34(2)(b), namely, that the dispute was not capable of settlement under the law for the time being in force and that the arbitral award was in conflict with the Public Policy of India, namely, against the relevant land laws. Since the event of refusal to amalgamate the plots was subsequent to the passing of the award, the same was not forming part of the record of the arbitral tribunal. Further, the award of the arbitral tribunal being an exparte award, no evidence was before the arbitral tribunal on behalf of the respondents.

According to the Court, therefore, the affidavit thus disclosed specific document and the evidence required to be produced, thus establishing a strong exceptional case to permit the respondents to file affidavits/adduce additional evidence. However, despite the Courts observation that “the cross-examination of the persons swearing in to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary as the truth will emerge on the reading of the affidavits filed by both the parties,” no separate reasoning was provided by the Court for allowing cross-examination in the matter. The Court plainly added that, “at the same time, the appellant also can be permitted to cross-examine and/or produce contrary evidence.”

It is pertinent to note that as it appears, the permission to adduce additional evidence has been granted because the pre-amendment position of law has been applied. This was because not only were the proceedings commenced before the amendments, the award was also delivered prior to the amendments. After the amendment in 2019, the section does away with the requirement of furnishing proof under Section 34(2)(a) of the Arbitration Act. The phrase “party making the application furnishes proof” has been substituted with the words “establishes on the basis of the Arbitral Tribunal’s record that.” Further, the proceedings under section 34 before the Court has been made time bound.

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[1] (2009 ) 17 SCC 796

[2] (2018) 9 SCC 49

[3] The judgment in Canara Nidhi Limited vs. M. Shashikala Civil Appeal Nos. 7544-7545 of 2019 further affirms the position.

[4] [CIVIL APPEAL NO. 73 OF 2023 decided on  19.01.2023]

In a recent case of M/s. Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP & Anr [CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6774 OF 2022], once again question that emerged  for the consideration of Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified  in allowing  the   application   under  Section   11(5)   &  (6)  of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for appointing the arbitrators without considering the aspect of arbitrability of dispute as per the relevant clauses under the Agreement.  As per the Agreement executed between the parties, if any conflict or difference arose between the parties or in case either party refuses or neglects to perform its part of the obligations under Agreement,  then such issues were not arbitrable but the other party had right to get the agreement specifically enforced through the appropriate court of law. Therefore, the question whether the dispute is arbitrable or not, was to be considered by the Court or by the arbitral tribunal in the light of the very terms of the said agreement.

The Court while analysing the issue went into underling the relevance of contract and observed that the reliefs to the parties shall not travel beyond the terms of the contract executed between the parties. It is because a contract is a transaction between two parties and has been entered into with open eyes and by understanding the nature of contract and that such contract has to   be interpreted giving literal meanings unless there is some ambiguity therein. The Court further referred to the judgment in Harsha  Construction  Vs.  Union  of  India and Ors.  (2014) 9 SCC 246 and observed that a contract with regard to arbitration has to be an expressed one. It must be in writing as per the legislation. In Harsha  Construction case it was clearly held that it was not open to the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon the disputes which had   been expressly  “excepted” and thus non-arbitrable. An award, therefore, so far as it related to disputes   regarding   non¬arbitrable   disputes  was bad in law  and liable to be quashed.

The Court further referred to the judgment in Vidya Drolia and Ors. Vs. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1 to elaborate on the aspect of arbitrability and its determination at the stage of application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court observed that the issue of non-arbitrability of a dispute is basic for arbitration as it relates to the very jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. As per Vidya Drolia and a catena of judgments decided earlier, the question of arbitrability, specially relating   to   the   inquiry whether   the   dispute   was   governed   by   the   arbitration clause, can be examined by the Courts at the reference stage itself. Further, Court can examine the validity   of   an arbitration   agreement, the authority which is covered by the expression, “existence of arbitration agreement” in Section 11 of the Arbitration   Act. Court shall not refer the matter for arbitration and as a demurrer interfere under section 8 and 11 when  it is manifestly and ex facie certain   that   the   arbitration   agreement   is   non-¬existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable and also when the matter is demonstrably “non-arbitrable   and   to   cut   off   the deadwood.”  The judicial scrutiny may however vary with the nature and   facet   of   non-arbitrability. If, however, the contentions relating to non–arbitrability are plainly arguable, the court by default shall refer the matter for arbitration. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the Court in the present matter held that the dispute is not arbitrable since the claims have been excepted by the clear term in the Agreement.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment[1] held that when a discretion is vested in the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to determine the rate of interest, whether the interest is payable on whole or any part of the money  and whether it is to be awarded to the whole or any part of the  period stipulated, the Tribunal has the duty to apply its mind and give reasons as to how it deems a certain interest rate as reasonable and to decide why the interest is payable on whole or any part of the money and also as to why it is to be awarded to the whole or any part of the  period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, The Hon’ble Court reduced the rate of interest from 18% to 9% and further reduced the period by 20 odd years on account of the lapse of the Claimant-Respondent in taking timely action.

The Respondent was awarded the contract for construction of missing link of 3 kms stretch on NH­6 on 16^th December, 1971 to be completed within one year. The contract amount was Rs.4,59,330/­.   However the work could be completed by 30^th August 1977. The Respondent was already paid an amount of Rs.3,36,465/­ by then. The Respondent issued a notice to the Appellant regarding his claim only on 25^th July 1989 followed by the Respondent filing his claim of Rs.1,45,28,198/­ and interest @ 19.5% from 1^st April 1976 to 15^th March 2002.  The learned   Arbitrator,   vide   award   dated   24^th August   2004, awarded a sum of Rs.9,20,650/­ and an interest  pendent lite with effect from 1^st April 1976 to the date of the award at the rate of 18% per annum which came to Rs. 46,90,000/­. The learned Arbitrator further directed the future interest to be paid at the rate of 18% per annum on the total of the aforesaid two amounts till actual payment.

The Award was challenged on various grounds including on the ground that the interest   amount   of   Rs.46,90,000/­   is almost   five   times   that   of   the   main   award   amount   of Rs.9,20,650/­. The Appellant relied on the judgments in Rajendra   Construction   Co.   v.   Maharashtra Housing   &   Area   Development   Authority   and   Others [(2005) 6 SCC 678], Krishna   Bhagya   Jala   Nigam   Ltd.   v.   G.   Harischandra Reddy and Another [(2007) 2 SCC 720] and Mcdermott International Inc. v. Burn   Standard   Co.   Ltd.   and   Others [(2006) 11 SCC 181].

The Court examined the issue in the light of the discretion given to an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) to determine the rate of interest, whether interest would be applicable on the whole or any part of the money awarded, and whether it shall be applicable for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. The Court arrived at the decision that such discretion when vested in the Arbitral Tribunal, it has a duty to exercise the discretion while applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and give reasons for arriving at a certain interest rate, the sum of which it shall be applicable, and period for which it shall apply.

The Court observed that the Arbitral Tribunal in the matter did not do any such exercise of reasoning and further failed to exclude the period of more than 20 years during which it was the Respondent-Claimant who did not raise its claim and further did not take any action after decree was passed in 1990 and then after passing of 1996 Act until 2001 when the Respondent-Claimant finally filed an application under section 11 of the 1996 Act. The Court in this regard held that a party cannot be permitted to derive benefits from its own lapses. With regard to the determination of the rate of interest, the Court made reference to various judgments including the observation made by the Court in Mcdermott International Inc. wherein it was held that given the long lapse of time, it will be in furtherance of justice to reduce the rate of interest while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Court, accordingly found that the present case was also a fit case wherein this Court needed to exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to reduce the rate of interest. While taking into consideration the conduct of the Respondent in delaying the proceedings at every stage which led to a long pendency of the dispute, the Court concluded that, though it will not be in the interest of justice to interfere with the principal award, it would be a fit case wherein the interest at all the three stages, that is pre­reference period, pendente lite and post­award period, requires to be reduced. The Court, therefore, was pleased to reduce the rate of interest to 9% from 18%

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[1] Executive Engineer (R and B) and Ors. v. Gokul Chandra Kanungo (Dead) Thr. His Lrs. [CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8990 OF 2017 decide on 30.09.2022]

Recently, in the matter of Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. NCC Limited [CIVIL APPEAL NO. 341 OF 2022 decided on 20.07.2022] once again the Hon’ble Supreme Court confirmed that the judicial inquiry under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not confined   only   to ascertain   as to   whether   or not   a   binding arbitration agreement   exists and the Court cannot mechanically refer the dispute to arbitration. The Court needs to apply its mind and decide whether the arbitration agreement is valid and whether the dispute is covered by the arbitration clause.

As per the ratio in the case, “However, at the same time, we do not agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that after the insertion of Sub-Section (6¬A) in Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, scope of inquiry by the   Court   in   Section   11   petition   is   confined   only   to ascertain   as  to   whether   or  not   a   binding  arbitration agreement   exists  qua  the   parties   before   it,   which   is relatable to the disputes at hand. We are of the opinion that though the Arbitral Tribunal may have jurisdiction and   authority   to   decide   the   disputes   including   the question of jurisdiction and non-arbitrability, the same can also be considered by the Court at the stage of deciding Section 11 application if the facts are very clear and glaring and in view of the specific clauses in the agreement   binding   between   the   parties,   whether   the dispute   is   non-arbitrable   and/or   it   falls   within   the excepted clause. Even at the stage of deciding Section 11 application, the Court may prima facie consider even the aspect with regard to ‘accord and satisfaction’ of the claims.”

The Court has essentially maintained the position of law as laid down in DLF Home Developers Limited v. Rajapura Homes Private Limited & Anr and DLF Home Developers Limited v. Begur OMR Homes Private Limited & Anr [both decided on September 22, 2021] wherein it had held that the Courts are “not expected to act mechanically merely to deliver a purported dispute raised by an applicant at the doors of the chosen Arbitrator.” The Court had ruled that the Courts are “obliged to apply their mind to the core preliminary issues, albeit, within the framework of Section 11(6-A) of the Act.” The position of law is an extension of what fundamentally the Apex Court ruled in Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1 and if we go backwards, in  Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited [(2017) 9 SCC 729]. The three judge bench in Vidya Drolia explained theconcept of limited prima facie review. The Court held that the scope of judicial review and jurisdiction under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act is extremely limited and is to be exercised in rare occasions only and went on to clarify that although a prima facie examination does not mean full review, the purpose of the scrutiny is to weed out manifestly invalid arbitration agreements and non-arbitrable disputes. Further, it may be that certain cases require a still deeper consideration during prima facie examination but this should be done with measured restraint. The Supreme Court, however, cautioned that the scrutiny made by the Courts should be done only to effectuate the arbitration process.

As per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when an application under section 34 of the 1996 Act is moved by the Award Debtor along with the application for remitting the matter to the Arbitrator, the only power invested in the Court is to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in Section 34(4) of the 1996 Act. As per the Section 34(4), the Court can defer the hearing of the objection filed under Section 34 on a written request made by a party to enable the Arbitral Tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings so that the grounds for setting aside or in other words, the deficiencies in the arbitral award may be eliminated by the Arbitral Tribunal. The matter cannot be remanded for fresh decision by the Arbitral Tribunal which has become functus officio.

The law has also been laid in clear terms in the matter of McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. [(2006) 11 SCC 181]. In the matter of Radha Chemicals v Union of India [Civil Appeal No. 10386 of 2018] it was once again laid down that “the court while deciding a Section 34 (Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) petition has no jurisdiction to remand the matter to the Arbitrator for a fresh decision”. The issue has been addressed in the matters of Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. (2018) 11 SCC 328 wherein it was held that objective behind section 34(4) is to make the award enforceable and in Som Datt Builders Limited v. State of Kerala (2009) 10 SCC 259 wherein the Court held that in view of Section 34(4) of the Act, the High Court ought to give the Arbitral Tribunal an opportunity to give reasons, if the same have not been given in the original arbitral award.

Recently, in the matter of Dr. A. Parthasarathy & Ors v. E Springs Avenues Pvt. Ltd &Ors.  [SLP (C) Nos. 1805-1806/2022], the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with an impugned order wherein the High Court, in exercise of power under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, had set aside the award passed by the learned Arbitrator and has remanded the matter to the Arbitrator for fresh decision. While deciding the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court wholly relied upon its decisions in Kinnari Mullick and Anr. Vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani (2018) 11 SCC 328 and I-Pay Clearing Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. ICICI Bank Ltd. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 4. The Court held that the High Court under section 37 of the 1996 Act either may refer the parties for fresh arbitration or may consider the appeal on merits on the basis of the material available on record within the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The Court clarified that the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to remand the matter to the same arbitrator for fresh decision/arbitration. This is otherwise permissible only by the consent of both the parties that the matter be referred to the same arbitrator.

In the Kinnari Mullick the Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborately discussed various aspects of power to remand the matter – when can the matter be remanded, what is the objective of remand and what are the limitations to the power in the light of provision under section 34(4) of the 1996 Act. The central issue involved in the case was whether Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 empowers the Court to relegate the parties back before the Arbitral Tribunal after having set aside the arbitral award in question. Additionally, it was also determined whether the court can exercise the power in absence of any specific application/prayer of the parties in this regard.

In Kinnari Mullick the award was challenged by the appellants and was set aside on the ground that it is devoid of any reasons for its findings. On appeal, the decision of the Single Bench of the Hon’ble High Court was affirmed. The Division Bench additionally suo moto decided to remand the matter back before the Ld. Arbitral Tribunal directing the Ld. Tribunal to provide reasons in support of the findings. The said part of the decision of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court.

Adverting to Section 34(4) of the 1996 Act, the Court observed that the Court can defer the hearing of the application filed under Section 34 only on a written request made by a party so that the grounds for setting aside or in other words, the deficiencies in the arbitral award may be eliminated by the arbitral tribunal. The Court cannot ive a direction suo moto. The Court added that “The quintessence for exercising power under this provision is that the arbitral award has not been set aside.” In other words, even a party cannot move an application under section 34(4) of the 1996 Act once the award has been set aside by the court. The Court explained that this is because consequent to disposal of the main proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court would become functus officio.

In the matter of I-Pay Clearing, the appellant, along with the application under section 34, moved an application under section 34(4) seeking directions to adjourn the proceedings for a period of three months and direct the learned Arbitrator to issue appropriate directions with regard to an issue where the Arbitrator had failed to give its findings. The main objection was filed on the ground that the Arbitrator has failed to record detailed reasons for its findings and thus, the same is patently illegal and erroneous. The High Court dismissed the application under section 34(4) of the 1996 Act on the ground that the defect in the arbitral award is not curable. The appellant preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the said order of dismissal of application under section 34(4) of the 1996 Act.

The Court explained that there is a difference between a finding and reasons. Findings are the decision on an issue. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain findings are based and the actual findings. Section 34(4) of the Act, can be resorted to record reasons on the finding already given in the award or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning of the award. However, when prima facie it is case of patent illegality, as was pleaded by the respondent also, the same is required to be considered by the Court itself. Further, the Court has discretion to decide on the question as to whether a good case has been made out for relegating the parties back to the arbitral tribunal under section 34(4) of the 1996 Act i.e. showing that “there is inadequate reasoning or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning, in support of the findings which are already recorded in the award”. It is not obligatory on the Court to remit the matter in all the cases where party makes an application. The Court further clarified that, “If there are no findings on the contentious issues in the award or if any findings are recorded ignoring the material evidence on record, the same are acceptable grounds for setting aside the award itself…. A harmonious reading of Section 31, 34(1), 34(2A) and 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, make it clear that in appropriate cases, on the request made by a party, Court can give an opportunity to the arbitrator to resume the arbitral proceedings for giving reasons or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning in support of a finding, which is already rendered in the award.” Therefore, we may conclude that the law is more than settled as to the limited purpose for which and in limited circumstances in which a matter may be relegated to the Arbitral Tribunal by the Court exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under section 34(4) of the 1996 Act on application moved by a party in this regard. Needless to say this is different from the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to correct the award under section 33 of the 1996 Act and to make an additional award under section 33(4) of the 1996 Act where the parties can move an application directly before the Arbitral Tribunal and seek an appropriate remedy.