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Is Cow Hug Day a Victim of Indian Politics or is it the Intellectual Colonialism?

Do you know what is Turmeric Latte (American), traditional Indian daybed (Australian), Chew Sticks (European) or Gratitude Rock (American) presently being marketed and sold in foreign markets? It is nothing but Haldi ka doodh, Chaarpai/Khaat, Daatun and Shiv Ling/similarly rounded stones.

We are aware of the patents granted for Turmeric, Basmati rice, Neem and Yog techniques in the United States and the India’s long legal battle against it. Recently, I also found that cow urine or what we know as Gau Mutra has been awarded as many as seven patents for its medicinal properties across the world, more particularly for its bio-enhancer and an antibiotic, antifungal and anti-cancer agent. [More information in Journal of Ayurveda and Integrative Medicine]. I am sure your learned self can add more to the list.

But the most mind boggling fact that I have come across lately is Koe Knuffelen. It is prevalent in the West for two decades now, particularly in Holland and is supported by research papers in the International Journals. There are numerous publications found on the US National Library of Medicine website. Koe Knuffelen  is the name of a therapy which literally means ‘cow hugging’. The services are charged on hourly basis in the US and Europe. Queer! This fact finding of mine was a by-product of search on the benefits of cow cuddling, which in turn was prompted by recent notification from the Animal Welfare Board of India to make February the 14th as a Cow Hug Day (now withdrawn without any explanation). As much as it was ridiculed, trolled, memed and made subject to politically motivated speeches and discussions (CNN being on the top of the searches on Google), the only question I had was – is there really a possible science behind it? To my surprise, there is.

The people of the wiser generations would know better. As scientifically found and proven in the West (and I am ashamed to be quoting this rather than referring to the practice of caressing cows that has been part of Indian society and the references found in the Vedas) it, amongst other therapeutic cures, releases oxytocin and thus lowers the stress. In India, Sri S P Gupta, former Chairman of Animal Welfare Board of India started a cow cuddling Centre. Gau Sparsh Chikitsa has been started in 2021 by Kamdhenu Gowdham and Ayogya Sansthan in Haryana.

Sad part is that the less wise generation of ours (if I may call them the ‘have-nots’- including me)  have been so ignorant and disconnected with the depth and richness of the Indian culture – the actual education (not speaking of Macaulay’s prototype education system of making human robotic servants for serving the British Government) – that what they know is to heedlessly ridicule and color an initiative as political and impractical rather than understanding where is it coming from and attacking it systematically and rationally to come out with something substantial for the benefit of everyone. It seems this culture is imbibed from our Parliament lately.  It is unfortunate to see youngsters (even politicians) saying “Oh how insane to hug a cow, it will hit me..!!!” Well, bingo! You got it right. It will. 12th of February is a Hug Day. My question is – do you go berserk and just hug anyone on the street??  Or do you kiss random people on February 13th?

No, this is not something that I am writing to educate anyone (me being the most ignorant) or to support a ‘Cow Hug Day’ vis-a-vis Valentine’s Day. I am happy to celebrate anything that makes me cheerful, provided it is lawful and moral and not hurtful to ‘common prudent man’. This is rather to question the very fad on social media of contesting and approaching something cynically as the first mechanism of attack rather than approaching it rationally with pertinent questions in the first place.

Well, on the flip side, I also believe the approach of the Animal Welfare Board is to be equally blamed. After all, one should not assume the general awareness and metal preparedness of the people to accept the idea, more so, when cow is now a political animal and what all one witnesses, and is familiar with, is cows consuming single use plastics on the streets of National Capital.  I conjecture at the same time that people who are in the National Capital and own cows and can enlighten us on this aspect are either shy of expressing their views or perhaps do not use such social media platforms at all. Needless to say about others – the cow-owners who do not stay in metropolitan cities. So I do not expect to find a balance in the type of people who would be expressing their views on such platforms.

Nevertheless, in my view, for introducing anything close to a Cow Hug Day, there is a need for a close examination of the very reason why the West is studying the need of cow therapies. Why now? It demands an introspection of how the family structures have significantly transformed within a generation (family being the smallest unit of a society). The families in India for that matter have diminished from joint families, with farm animals around, to nuclear families and individuals living alone. One of the products of such disintegrated society over the years is stress, clinically known as depression if it persists. It is therefore now, in the last couple of decades that social scientists are compelled to think of methods of emancipation from the effects of solitude and artificially generated social pressures.

Broadly speaking, unless the ground realities are checked, acknowledged and studied and an acceptable mechanism is charted, there will be rejections of domestic initiatives. So much so that the tragedy being that the very concept, that the Indians of my generation never even realise as an integral part of our cutural fabric, comes back to us as an intensely researched and proved theory/therapy and we on the other hand regressively dismiss the domestic initiatives in limine as conservative or absurdly ludicrous.

Anubha Dhulia Advocate, Delhi, Founder and Managing Partner, Nautiliyaa Legal.

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Whether Cinema Theatres Can Prohibit Movie Goers From Bringing Eatables Inside Cinema Halls

Nearly all, who have watched movies in theatre, know that food is prohibited inside theatres. This is usually aimed at encouraging in-house sale of food in cinema halls. The food is sold at exorbitant prices. There are at the cinemas notices pasted outside the hall prohibiting carrying outside food and security personnel search the belongings of every cinema goer with a view to enforce the prohibition. In the event that movie goers are found in possession of eatables, they are asked to leave the food behind.

Two advocates in Jammu and Kashmir filed a PIL against cinema owners on this issue before the Hon’ble High Court of J&K. The contention of the Petitioners mainly hinged on the fact that Jammu and Kashmir Cinemas (Regulation) Rules 1975 framed under Jammu and Kashmir Cinematograph Act,1989 for regulating public exhibitions by means of Cinematographs, does not include prohibition with respect to carrying food. The food sold inside the cinema halls is at a high price and the prohibition results in cinema goers being compelled to purchase junk food and water from theatre premises. Then there can be viewers who may be accompanied by infant and elders with special dietary requirements or viewers who are, say diabetic for instance. According to the Petitioners, the act of cinema owners imposing such restriction on food tantamount to violation of the right to choice of food, including the right not to eat junk food and right to good health, which comes under the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir gave a verdict in favour of the Petitioners directing the multiplexes and cinema halls owners of the State of J&K not to prohibit cinema goers/viewers henceforth from carrying his/her own food articles and water inside the theatre.

When the judgment was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Court went into the analysis of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution  which recognizes the right of citizens to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to the reasonable restrictions as prescribed under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. The Court referred to the judgment in Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj v. T.N. Legislative Assembly (2016) 6 SCC 82 to add that the right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution includes all activities which enable citizens to generate economic benefits and earn a livelihood.

As a foremost observation, the Court stated that none of the laws framed by the State Government including Jammu and Kashmir Cinemas (Regulation) Rules 1975, Cinematograph Act 1952, the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules 1983 and, the Jammu and Kashmir Cinematograph Act 1989 contain a rule compelling the owner of a cinema theatre to allow a movie goer to bring food or beverages from outside within the precincts of the theatre or includes any provision which requires theatre owners to permit movie goers to carry food and beverages of their own into the cinema hall. The Court found that “legislature’s omission of a provision requiring the cinema owner to allow eatables and beverages to be brought from outside is significant”. Further, the Court observed that cinema theatres are private properties of the owners which entitles them to imposed certain terms and conditions so long as they do not prejudice public interest, safety and welfare. Since a cinema owner is running a business, he has the freedom to determine the terms to make his business economically viable and further to maximise his profitability. The condition to not allow bringing food in the theatre premises is well within the right conferred by the Constitution and is also not contrary to public interest, safety or welfare.

The Court further appreciated the fact that cinema halls are no longer a place solely for exhibiting cinematographic films but offers a bundle of entertainment where provision of food also forms a part and adds to the profitability of business. Although the Petitioners have contended that the food being sold in the theatres is junk food and thus unhealthy and at the same time sold at exorbitant price, the Court observed that it being part of the commercial decision, the cinema owners have the liberty to decide the menu of the food being sold in their theatre along with the price of the items being served in their premises.

Movie goers on the other hand have the choice of not purchasing/consuming the food being sold at the theatre if it is not to their liking.  The purchase of a movie ticket in no way compels the movie goer to purchase and consume the food at the theatre. In other words, “they are not being prevented from exercising their right to choice of food.” The Court therefore, concluded that “Whether or not to watch a movie is entirely within the choice of viewers. If viewers seek to enter a cinema hall, they must abide by the terms and conditions subject to which entry is granted. Having reserved the right of admission, it is open to theatre owners to determine whether food from outside the precincts of the cinema hall should be permitted to be carried inside.

The Court then went on to further understand the concept of unequal bargaining power as explained in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156 and whether this would apply in the case before them. The judgment in Central Inland Water assesses whether the parties have unequal bargaining power relative to one another and lays down when a contractual term or a contract is unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable. The Court summarised that a contract (or a term in a contract) can be said to be unfair or unreasonable if it is one-sided or devoid of any commercial logic. The Court explained that commercial logic of prohibiting movie goers from carrying their own food to the cinema hall is to stimulate and boost a vital aspect of the business – the sale of food and beverages and any restriction on that in the likes of what the Petitioners have been seeking shall prejudice the economic activity of the business owners. The viewers are bound by the conditions of entry in the cinemas in the same way as visitors who are prohibited to take pictures in museums or audience who are banned from recording live performances etc. The Court therefore found the judgment of the High Court in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court held that the High Court was not justified in issuing a direction prohibiting theatre owners from disallowing food and beverages to be brought in by persons entering a movie theatre who enter it for viewing a film. The Court, however, requested the cinema owners to look at the movie goers with chronic diseases who may have received dietary instructions from doctors or are under dietary restrictions due to medical conditions on case to case basis.

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Does Municipal Corporation of Delhi has Accountability Towards Delhi Government or Central Government

Recently, Aam Aadmi Party won by thumping majority bagging a 134 out of a total of 250 councillors seat in Delhi Municipal Corporation elections, with BJP confined to 104.  Immediately after few days of election results, spokesperson of the Delhi unit of BJP Praveen Shankar Kapoor said that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has no accountability towards the Delhi government or the Vidhan Sabha of the city. Instead, after the amendment in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 2022, the MCD is now under the Central Government or its representative Lieutenant Governor. This is a brief attempt, therefore, to look into the amendments that have been introduced in the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 2022 (“2022 Amendments”) and determine whether and what changes have been introduced in the legislation so as to shift the weight and answerability of MCD to the Centre.

The Amendment Act, 2022 was passed on 18th April, 2022 by the assent of the President of India. The foremost important change that has been introduced is unification of Municipal Corporations in Delhi. It replaces the three municipal corporations under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 with one Corporation named the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The Amendment Act further changed the following (in sections 1, 3A, 5, 6, 32A, 55, 56, 57, 193, 330A and 499, for the word “Government”, wherever it occurred, the words “Central Government” was substituted):

  • Total number councillor seats were decreased from 272 to maximum of 250;
  • The Amendment Act omits the provision for a Director of Local Bodies who was appointed to assist the Delhi government;
  • The Act empowered Central Government to appoint a Special Officer to exercise powers of the Corporation until the first meeting of the Corporation is held after the commencement of the Act;
  • The Act introduced obligatory functions of the new Corporation to establish an e-governance system for citizen services on anytime-anywhere basis for better, accountable, and transparent administration; and
  • The Act omits the provision regarding  the condition of employment of a sweeper employed for doing house scavenging of a building where there is a requirement to provide a reasonable cause or a 14 day notice before discontinuing his service.

Along with the changes as stated above, the Amendment Act further empowers Central Government, in place of the Delhi Government, to decide matters which were under the Delhi Government as per amendments introduced in 2011.  These included: (i) total number of seats of councillors and number of seats reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes, (ii) division of the area of corporations into zones and wards, (iii) delimitation of wards, (iv) matters such as salary and allowances, and leave of absence of the Commissioner, (v) sanctioning of consolidation of loans by a corporation, and (vi) sanctioning suits for compensation against the Commissioner for loss or waste or misapplication of Municipal Fund or property.  

Above all, the Act now mandates that the Commissioner will exercise his powers regarding building regulations under the general superintendence and directions of Delhi government. As per section 330A:

330A. General superintendence, etc., of the Central Government.–Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the Commissioner shall exercise his powers and discharge his functions under this Chapter, under the general superintendence, direction and control of the Central Government. It is therefore, to an extent clear that there is a sea change that has been brought by the latest amendments to the MCD Act wherein the answerability lies to the Central Government instead of Delhi Government as it was for the last 11 years.

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Whether Section 69A of the Information and Technologies Act, 2002 gives power to the Central Government to issue orders for blocking of social media accounts?

Recently, yet another dispute stirred up between the social media giant Twitter and the Indian Government on account of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEIT) issuing a series of blocking orders to the former in relation to multiple twitter accounts and tweets posted on the social media page. As a matter of fact, the micro blogging site has been facing the heat from the Ministry since February 2021 where it has been asked to block almost 1500 accounts and 175 tweets till date. The matter precipitated when the Government finally issued notice dated 27.07.2022 to Twitter warning against punitive measures in the event Twitter does not comply with the blocking orders. Challenging the orders and notice, Twitter, which is a Significant Social Media Intermediary (SSMI) the Information Technologies Act, 2002 (2002 Act), filed a petition before the Karnataka High Court seeking to upend 39 blocking orders issued by the MEIT in June this year under section 69A of the 2002 Act.

As per section 69A, the Central Government has power to direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block the access by the public of any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to the said grounds. The Government while exercising the said power is required to record reasons in writing.

The essential argument of the Petitioner/Twitter before the Karnataka High Court is that the orders blocking contents are “procedurally and substantially deficient of the provision” and the ones blocking user accounts “demonstrate excessive use of powers and are disproportionate”. Further, the blocking orders fail to provide specifics and do not establish “proximate relationship to the grounds under Section 69A” – as to why the contents of tweets or accounts fall within the heads given under Section 69A of the 2002 Act and rather reiterate the grounds stated in the section. In other words the MEIT has not shown how content disrupts sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order, as contemplated under Section 69A of the 2002 Act.  Twitter has taken the Constitutional ground of violation of freedom of speech guaranteed to the users of the platform to voice their opinion. Twitter, before the Karnataka High Court, has further claimed that the ‘blocking orders’ are arbitrary and illegal for not being in consonance with the procedure set out in the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access to Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (2009 Rules) and for not being in line with the ‘least intrusive test’ as recognised by the Supreme Court in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Another v. Union of India and Others [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012] (famously known as Adhaar case).

Twitter has also cited the affidavit filed by the MEIT in the matter of Sanjay R Hegde v. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and Anr [WP(C) 13275 of 2019] before the Delhi High Court. In this matter it was Twitter that had suspended Mr. Hedge’s twitter account. The issue raised in the writ petition against Twitter (averred to be doing a public function) is regarding permanent suspension of the twitter account of petitioner, Mr. Hedge, being contrary to the Twitter Rules and in violation of rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution of India. Twitter Rules prohibit contents that exhibit –  a. Violence; b. Terrorism/violent extremism; c. Child sexual exploitation; d. Abuse/Harassment; e. Hateful Conduct; f. Suicide or self-harm; g. Sensitive media, including graphic violence and adult content; h. Illegal or certain regulated goods or services; i. Publication of another person’s private information; j. Publication of Non-consensual nudity; k. Platform manipulation and spam; l. Manipulating with election integrity; m. Impersonation; n. Infringement of Copyright and Trademark. As per the petitioner, Mr. Hedge, the re-post of a poem titled ‘Gorakh Pandey’s poem ‘Unko phaansi de do’ and use of picture of August Landmesser as the ‘header’/ ‘cover picture’ of his Twitter profile was not covered in any of the heads prohibited under Twitter Rules. The Writ Petition prayed for issuing appropriate writ to frame guidelines to ensure that online speech is not arbitrarily censored by social media websites and also for restoring the account.

Clearly, the issues involved in the two matters, presently pending before the high courts, are different. While the petition before the Delhi High Court questions the action of blocking by the social media platform – Twitter, the petition before the Karnataka High Court challenges the orders issued by the Government to Twitter directing it to block the accounts of the users.

Further, the issue before the Delhi High Court is whether Twitter is within its rights and authority to block the account of Mr. Hedge (which perhaps still remains blocked)? This would also necessarily require the finding on whether a writ is maintainable against a private entity like Twitter and whether it is performing a public function so as to be covered under the umbrella of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The issues before Karnataka High Court, on the other hand, is whether the exercise of power of issuing successive blocking orders by the Government to Twitter under section 69A of the 2002 Act is ultra vires or in other words is excessive and arbitrary? Whether this is a violation of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India?

The MIET has exercised its power under section 69A of the 2002 Act which not only gives an authority to exercise power of blocking but also lays down obligation on the Government to state the reasons to be recorded in writing while issuing the blocking to the intermediary. Further, when the Central Government has satisfied itself that the grounds provided under section 69A are met, it can by order direct the intermediary to block ‘any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource’. It does not state that the power extends to blocking or ordering the blocking of the very social media account permanently or even temporarily, essentially taking away from the account user’s right of any future publication (which changes the nature of order to punitive from protective) and also curbs the right of a reader to have access to the previous and future tweets which were not objectionable under section 69A of the 2002 Act. The power given to the Central Government under section 69A(1) is further subject to section 69A(2) which states that the “procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed”. The procedure and safeguards have been provided under Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access to Information by Public) Rules, 2009. Therefore, there are two clear riders to the exercise of power under section 69A(1) of the 2002 Act. Firstly, to follow the procedure as given in the 2009 Rules and secondly, while issuing the order, to record reason for its satisfaction in writing. Since the exercise of power by the Government is subject to these conditions, any order issued without following the due process shall not only render it illegal but also ultra vires and in conflict with fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. The analysis and finding of the same is primarily factual (other than to determine the essential nature of power and its objective given under section 69A) and the Court shall certainly go into the fact finding whether the riders were fulfilled by the Government. With regard to the argument regarding the constitutionality of blocking orders and the same being ‘disproportionate’, Twitter has apparently relied on the ‘least intrusive test’ and ‘proportionality standard of review’ or ‘proportionality test’. It is pertinent to make clear at this point that Twitter is not challenging the constitutionality of the provision under section 69A of 2002 Act. The law is settled and the provision has been upheld in the matter of Shreya Singhal v Union of India [Writ Petition (Criminal) No.167 of 2012 decided on 24th March 2015]. It remains to be seen whether the said tests can be applied in the case of exercise of power by a Government authority under a provision of law that has been held to be constitutional (this not being a case of challenge of the legislative provision itself).

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Har Ghar Khadi Ka Tiranga: The New Law w.r.t. National Flag

‘Har Ghar Tiranga’ is a campaign being promoted by the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India under the aegis of Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav to encourage people to bring the Tiranga home and hoist it on their houses from 13th to 15th August, 2022 to mark the 75th year of India’s independence.[1]

Indian Flag was adopted on 22nd July, 1947. The display, hoisting, and use of the Indian National Flag is presently governed by the Flag Code of India, 2002 and Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971. The Flag Code brings together all laws, conventions, practices, and instructions for the display of the National Flag and governs the display of the National Flag by private, public, and Government institutions. As the law stood earlier, machine made and polyester flags were not allowed to be used and “hand-spun and woven wool or cotton or silk khadi bunting” were only allowed. Further, the import of machine-made flags was banned in 2019 in order to boost the Khadi industry. The tricolour was allowed to be flown from sunrise to sunset only, irrespective of weather conditions.

Not very long ago, the Flag Code of India, 2002 has been amended vide Order dated 30th December, 2021 and National Flag made of polyester or machine made Flag have now been allowed. The Code has been further amended on 20th July, 2022 to state that where the Flag is displayed in open or displayed on the house of member of public, it may be flown day and night.  On 20th of July, 2022, the Home Ministry, Government of India has issued a direction bearing no. D.O. No. 2/01/2020-Public (Part-III) addressed to all the Ministries and Departments of the Government asking them to publicize the said changes to the general public.

In order to boost the campaign, all Post Offices in the country will start selling flags from 1st August 2022. Apart from physically hoisting the flag, the Ministry of Culture has launched a website where one can ‘Pin a Flag’ and also post a ‘Selfie with Flag’ to showcase one’s patriotism.[2]

Ironically, despite such zeal and promotion, the outcome of the said amendment does not seem to be very pretty when one looks at the ground situation. One, the size specified under the campaign is 20×30 inches and 16×27 inches. This is not permitted under the BIS’ standards for the National Flag. Some manufacturers, which are BIS approved, are finding it practically difficult to manufacture the flags as per the changed dimensions. Secondly, the manufacturers of Khadi Flags are shocked on National Flag made of polyester being allowed. According to them the sanctity of the tricolour has been played down rather demeaned by allowing polyester cloth. All those involved in the Khadi and Village Industries are struggling with relatively very less orders or no orders at all. The situation is grim.

Where on one hand, the Government has banned items made of single use plastic, allowing another form of plastic – polyester – to be used for making Flags seems to be an aberration in the overall policy. Also this seems to defeat the objective of promotion of Khadi industry by the Government. Khadi Sanghas have written to the Prime Minister and Home Minister seeking withdrawal of the amendment while they have planned a symbolic protest on July 27. This amendment, however, may have an explanation. One reason of introducing polyester is the difference in price of raw material . Polyester is cheap. Khadi, on the other hand, is facing a steep hike in price (highest in last decade) due to fall in the production of cotton in the country.

In this light, promotion and our support should rather go with showing solidarity with Khadi industry. Demand for National Flags made of Khadi can make a difference. Lets do a “Har Ghar Khadi ka Tiranga” instead of just celebrating “Har Ghar Tiranga” on this platinum celebration of Nation’s Independence Day.


[1] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1844020

[2] https://rashtragaan.in/, https://harghartiranga.com/

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